Coming Around to Amending the Pardon Power

For what I think are essentially good reasons, I am dispositionally opposed both to constitutional amendments that react to contemporary controversies and to proposed reforms of the pardon power that seek to prevent abuse at the cost of its availability in cases of genuine need. But we also have a history of amendments—most clearly the 13th, 14th and 15th—that are motivated by the original ideals of the regime. Moreover, constitutional conservatism calls for prudence, not obstinacy.  In light of recent events—along with the memory of Bill Clinton’s midnight pardons—I’m coming around to Keith Whittington’s position, articulated here, that an amendment to reform … Continue reading Coming Around to Amending the Pardon Power

A Friendly Amendment to Susan McWilliams Barndt’s Essay

Susan McWilliams Barndt’s essay on preventing tyranny by making public office less appealing is characteristically incisive. I share her desire to make the presidency in particular less attractive. Susan, to be clear, wants to make public office unappealing for people who seek it for private gain—not for people who seek it for honorable purposes. I offer the following as a friendly amendment to see whether Susan would accept it. I don’t think the presidency is appealing primarily for venal reasons. Trump is an outlier in that regard. I do think it is appealing for other constitutionally unhealthy motives, including the excess power … Continue reading A Friendly Amendment to Susan McWilliams Barndt’s Essay

Corruption and Arrogance in American Politics

Jeff Tulis does readers a tremendous service by reorienting the contemporary conversation about corruption toward the word’s classical sense: the corruption of institutions. In Machiavelli’s terms, or Montesquieu’s, corruption means turning an institution from its purpose, which is why the Discourses on Livy begin … Continue reading Corruption and Arrogance in American Politics

Federalist 10 and the Search for Common Ground

The caricature of Federalist 10 is that Madison aims to fracture majorities to prevent factious rule—what Tocqueville would later call “the tyranny of the majority.” That reading is wrong on several levels, including the fact that Madison never actively fractures anyone. He simply observes that the natural conditions of an extended republic make it difficult for majority factions to form or, if they do, to prevail. In his Preface to Democratic Theory, Robert Dahl spotted what he thought was a fatal flaw: “[N]o modern Madison has shown that the restraints on the effectiveness of majorities imposed by the facts of a pluralistic … Continue reading Federalist 10 and the Search for Common Ground