Why a Trial for Trump?

There will be a Senate trial of Donald Trump after he is no longer in office. Because the impeachment process is designed as a mode of high politics to remove a president who abuses his office and the public trust, and if convicted, he would still be subject to criminal prosecution if warranted, many citizens will wonder: why have a Senate trial to remove him from an office he no longer holds? There are several reasons. The trial will be the opening exercise in a national Reckoning designed to diagnose the damage that Trump and Trump enablers did to the … Continue reading Why a Trial for Trump?

Podcast on Impeachment and Pardons

Connor Ewing and I recently did a podcast on Podopticon with Randal Hendrickson the day before the impeachment vote in the House. We discussed impeachment and previewed the argument that Corey Brettschneider and I make the next day in the Washington Post about the pardon power. We were able to raise new issues regarding some topics earlier discussed here on the The Constitutionalist and in The Atlantic. Continue reading Podcast on Impeachment and Pardons

More on Crimes and High Crimes

As usual, a terrific and thought-provoking post by Greg Weiner. I have a couple of amendments. The most important one is that the impeachment clauses of the Constitution were written with the British impeachment of Warren Hastings in mind and underway. As Raul Berger showed years ago, “high crimes and misdemeanors” was a technical phrase invented many years before the crimes we now know as misdemeanors was invented. What we call misdemeanors were called trespasses at the time the idea of high crimes and misdemeanors was devised. The original idea, imported into our Constitution, meant primarily abuse of office. That … Continue reading More on Crimes and High Crimes

Impeachment and the Limits of the Pardon Power

Corey Brettschneider and I published a piece in the Washington Post this morning arguing that a president cannot pardon himself for high crimes that are the subject of his own impeachment, nor can he pardon others directly connected to those crimes. This is a controversial view within the legal establishment but it has never been addressed by courts. We defend our view at length in an earlier piece this past summer in The Atlantic. The point of today’s piece is to urge Congress to adopt our interpretation, and to formally express this constitutional interpretation in service of fortifying its impeachment … Continue reading Impeachment and the Limits of the Pardon Power

Limits to the Pardon Power

Some months ago, Corey Brettschneider and I wrote a piece for The Atlantic arguing that the traditional interpretation of the pardon power — that it is unlimited but for one very narrow exception — that the President cannot pardon any impeachment charge or conviction. We argue that impeachment should be understood more broadly to imply 1) that a president cannot pardon himself and 2) he can’t pardon others for crimes directly connected to an impeachment investigation of himself. We argue that the debates during the Philadelphia convention do not evidence a clear view of the delegates on this matter — … Continue reading Limits to the Pardon Power

The American Abyss

The best essay, so far, about the sources and meaning of the insurrection. Timothy Snyder took a lot of grief from sophisticated academics for his book On Tyranny and for his worry about the incipient American version of fascism. I am pretty sure that he takes no pleasure in the fact that he was right. This extraordinary piece by him in the New York Times is well worth reading. Continue reading The American Abyss

The End of The Rhetorical President on Steroids

The most significant check on, and rebuke of, President Donald Trump may have happened already — today. The CEO of Twitter announced that he has been permanently banned from the platform. And the CEO’s of Facebook and Instagram announced that he is suspended “indefinitely and for at least the next two weeks until the peaceful transition of power is complete.” Twitter was the core attribute and resource for Donald Trump’s leadership style. The ban was prompted by his incendiary rhetoric encouraging the insurrection. But twitter had shaped his entire presidency and had been a huge problem since he ran for … Continue reading The End of The Rhetorical President on Steroids

Emergency Government

This is a moment of real peril for the polity. In well constructed constitutions the executive is designed to be the institution capable of contending with emergencies. But what if the executive, the president, is the emergency. How can we meet the emergency now? I answer this question in a piece I published late last night at The Bulwark. Please read, discuss and circulate. Relevant to our current conversation here on The Constitutionalist is the need for Congressional and Cabinet suppleness, nuance, and creativity in mustering the resources of the Constitution to meet the moment. The 25th Amendment is one … Continue reading Emergency Government

Still Another Thought on January 6

Ben Kleinerman’s essay is a great example of a structural argument — the kind of argument that I believe, usually, makes the best sense of the Constitution. Here the point is to suggest that independence of the executive would be compromised by a legislature, in effect, supplanting the specially designed electoral college. To the extent that the EC produces uncontested results, I think this is a very strong argument. The 2020 presidential election is an example of one in which the Electoral College results are all certified, and in some cases adjudicated, according to the laws of each state. There … Continue reading Still Another Thought on January 6